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Abstract. This article investigates economic performance when enforceable
property rights are missing and subsistence needs matter. It shows that if
per capita income is suﬃciently high, a windfall gain in productivity triggers
behavior that leads to higher growth (the normal reaction). The same shock
can produce voracious behavior and lower growth when faced by poor economic
agents, in particular when their productivity is low and their society is largely
fractionalized. This leads to a re-assessment of the voracity eﬀect. Economic
and social performance depends no longer on character traits (the assumed
curvature of the utility function) as assumed in the earlier literature. Instead,
the initial degree of development, the state of technology, and the make up
of society are decisive. An extension towards a two-sector economy shows
that conditions for an active informal sector of low productivity are much less
restrictive than originally thought.
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A large empirical literature documents that economic performance suﬀers when institutions
are weak and property rights are poorly protected. How the competition of powerful, output
appropriating groups feeds back to economic growth was theoretically analyzed in a popular
and inﬂuential article by Lane and Tornell (1996). They proposed to investigates appropria-
tion behavior as a common pool resource game taking place within the framework of an Ak
growth model. By now their model has been developed further in various directions and entered
economic textbooks.1
One aspect that is emphasized by Lane and Tornell and the related literature is the so called
voracity eﬀect. Voracity means that the appropriating agents “overreact” to a positive pro-
ductivity shock (or terms of trade improvement) such that the triggered increase in the speed
of appropriation exceeds the gain in productivity. As a consequence growth declines after an
event that would lead to higher growth under “normal” circumstances, i.e. if property rights
were protected. Although thus deﬁned voracious behavior is probably not the most natural
reaction to economic shocks, Lane and Tornell (1996, 1999) have shown that voracity is indeed
an observable phenomenon in the recent history of several developing countries.
Unfortunately, the modelling of the voracity eﬀect – as it has been established in the literature
so far – entails undesirable “side-eﬀects”. For example, the model predicts that countries of high
productivity (where productivity exceeds time preference, A > nρ in the notation used below)
shrink at a constant rate, whereas otherwise identical countries of low productivity (where
A < nρ) grow at a positive rate. In fact, for countries of low productivity, voracity should
be a desirable feature according to the so far available theory. If voracity occurs, it turns a
previously negative rate of economic growth positive. Most naturally, we would probably expect
that countries plagued by voracity are converging to stagnation. Stagnation, however, occurs
independently of voracity only in the case of a knife-edge parameter constellation (when A = ρn).
Besides these qualitative imperfections the so far available theory entails also a quantitative
problem. It needs an implausibly high value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. If
there are two or more competing groups in society, σ has to be necessarily (not suﬃciently)
1For empirical literature on property rights and growth see, for example, Acemoglu et al., 2001, Easterly and
Levine, 2003, and Rodrik et al. (2004). For further developments of Lane and Tornell’s approach see Tornell and
Lane (1999), Lindner and Strulik (2004, 2008), Strulik (2008b), Mino (2006), and Long and Sorger (2006). A
detailed textbook treatment can be found in Drazen (2000).
1larger than one for voracity to exist. While the empirical literature not always agrees with Hall
(1988) that σ is close zero, it is probably fair to say that there is consensus between quantitative
macro- and empirical microeconomists that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is rarely
larger than one.2 In addition, several studies have shown that σ is particularly low for poor
individuals and increasing in wealth and consumption.3
The present article re-investigates Lane and Tornell’s setup now assuming that there are
subsistence needs so that preferences can be described by a Stone-Geary utility function. This
implies that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is no longer constant. It is zero at
subsistence level and – in line with the empirical evidence – increasing in consumption (and
thus indirectly in wealth). The comparatively small reﬁnement of the original setup leads to
quite drastic modiﬁcations of results and, in fact, towards a comprehensive re-assessment of the
voracity eﬀect.
It will be shown that in particular poor individuals are prone to voracious behavior in spite
of their currently small rate of intertemporal substitution. In fact, economic performance and
social behavior will be shown to be completely independent of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. Other factors matter for voracious behavior and poor economic performance.
Now, ceteris paribus, individuals are more likely to appropriate “too much”, i.e. to generate the
voracity eﬀect, if they are living close to subsistence needs, if they discount the future heavily
(for example, because they are living in a high mortality environment), if their society is largely
fractionalized, and if their productivity is low anyway.
While voracity could be interpreted as personality-speciﬁc behavior according to the earlier
literature (occurring for preferences with high enough σ), it becomes situation-speciﬁc behavior
according to the new approach. Individuals with the same preferences behave normally, i.e.
non-voraciously, when their income is suﬃciently high, when they are populating an economy
that is suﬃciently productive, and when society is suﬃciently little fractionalized. In that case
the economy may even manage to grow at a positive rate. Growth, however, will in any case be
lower than it could be if property rights were secure. It will also be aﬀected by the degree of
fractionalization, possibly in a non-linear way.
Moreover, voracity, is shown to be an “oﬀ-steady-state” phenomenon. If an economy is capable
of long-run growth despite of voracity, then voracious behavior disappears when income gets
2See, for example, Lucas (1990), Campbell and Mankiw (1989), and Patterson and Peseran (1992).
3Attansio and Browning (1995), Ogaki et. al (1996), Atkeson and Ogaki (1997), and Guvenen (2006).
2high enough. On the other hand, if a voracious economy is not capable of long-run growth,
it converges towards stagnation at subsistence level and voracity disappears as an observable
phenomenon because there is no growth.
In order to derive these results conveniently, Section 2 starts with the simplest case assuming
a logarithmic form of the utility function. Section 3 investigates the role of fractionalization
for economic performance and Section 4 the voracity eﬀect. In Section 5 I then show that
results are indeed independent from the assumed curvature of the Stone-Geary utility function.
Section 6 extends the model to the two-sector setup investigated in Tornell and Lane (1999).
It is shown that conditions for existence of an informal sector in which productivity is inferior
but property rights are secure are much more general than initially thought. A suﬃcient, not
necessary condition is that productivity in the informal sector exceeds the rate of time preference.
If productivity of the informal sector is not high enough, it depends on productivity of the
formal sector whether the economy grows and the informal sector disappears asymptotically
or whether the common access sector gets plundered completely and the economy stagnates,
relying exclusively on produce of the informal sector.
2. The Basic Model
Consider a society consisting of n groups of a measure [0,1] of individuals. A group is deﬁned
by the fact that its member cooperate with each other and compete with member of other
groups. Property rights are not deﬁned or not enforceable so that the economy’s aggregate
capital stock k is considered as a common pool resource. Output is produced via a linear Ak
production technology. With missing property rights, consumption of a group i, i = 1,...,n,
denoted by ci, equals its appropriation of output. In appropriating output members of a group
cooperate with each other and compete with members of other groups. In this endeavor they
follow a Markov strategy, ci(k). Let A denote capital productivity net of depreciation. Thus,
leftovers of output after appropriation – if there are any – deﬁne investment and the (common
pool) capital stock evolves according to (1).




The objective of each group is to maximize the present value of utility derived from consump-
tion,
R ∞
0 u(ci)e−ρtdt, where u(·) is an instantaneous utility function and ρ denotes the time
3preference rate. So far, the model coincides with Lane and Tornell (1996). Lane and Tornell
proceed by assuming an iso-elastic utility function.
Here, we instead assume that instantaneous utility is subject to subsistence consumption ¯ c, i.e.
it is of the Stone-Geary type, u(ci) = log(ci − ¯ c) for c > ¯ c and u(ci) = −∞ otherwise. Because
subsistence consumption prevails, the rate of intertemporal substitution, calculated as σs =
1−¯ c/ci, is no longer constant but determined by the degree of economic development. It assumes
a value of zero at subsistence level and converges towards one as income and consumption go to




log(ci − ¯ c) · e−ρtdt. (2)
Like Lane and Tornell we focus on symmetric equilibria. In the Appendix it is shown that







· ¯ c + ρk. (3)
Plugging (3) into (1) and noting that per capita output is y = Ak we obtain the growth rate
of output per capita g ≡ ˙ y/y = ˙ k/k as in (4).







Inspection of (4) reveals that there exists an equilibrium of stagnation at subsistence level
(c = ¯ c, k = n¯ c/A). Because ∂˙ k/∂k = A − ρn, the equilibrium is stable if A < nρ. Intuitively,
if the return on capital per group A/n is so small that it falls short of the time preference rate
ρ, the incentive to invest is so low that groups follow an extensive appropriation strategy. With
negative investment rates the economy converges towards stagnation. Again, the textbook case
of secure property is embedded for n = 1, i.e. when there is only one group in society. The
following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 1. The economy without property rights and subsistence needs grows at a positive
rate if and only if A > nρ. Ceteris paribus growth is more likely to be observed, if an economy
displays high productivity, if individuals are equipped with a low rate of time preference, and if
social fractionalization is low. Not growing economies stagnate at subsistence level.
4The results with respect to productivity A and time preference rate ρ are immediately in-
tuitive. The result with respect to n gets empirical support from Easterly and Levine (1997)
and Alesina et al. (2004). Intuitively, if a society is highly fractionalized and property rights
are absent, a higher share of the return of one group’s investment (in terms of foregone con-
sumption) is appropriated by members of other groups. Since (Markov strategy using) people
realize this fact, it drives down their individual incentive to invest. While the gross return on
capital is always A, without established property rights and n groups appropriating output, the
return appropriated by an investing groups is just A/n. In line with the familiar result from
neoclassical growth theory, there will be growth only if the individual net rate of return A/n
exceeds the rate of time preference.
Observe from (3) that the consumption rate ci/k converges to ρ for k → ∞. This means
that the current model converges towards the one of Tornell and Lane in the log-utility case if
output and consumption are perpetually growing. Observe also from (3) that under subsistence
needs (¯ c > 0) the consumption rate is increasing in k if productivity is suﬃciently low and the
society is suﬃciently fractionalized, i.e. for ρn > A. In this case the rate of investment into
capital, 1 − ci/k, is negatively associated with the level of capital, a fact that renders stability
of stagnation at subsistence level. As a consequence not all economies are equally suﬀering from
missing property rights. Disincentives on investment are particularly severe if productivity is
low and the society is fractionalized. If the society is suﬃciently homogenous and the economy
suﬃciently productive, A > ρn, it converges towards the growth path already obtained in the
literature.
3. Fractionalization vs. Polarization: Effects on Growth
If A/n > ρ, positive growth is viable with absent property rights albeit its rate is lower
than it could be if property right were secure. Furthermore, growth may depend on social
fractionalization in a nonlinear way. If the growth rate indeed assumes an extremum for a


















5If a minimum exists, it is then found at









This result is interesting with respect to the polarization literature (Esteban and Ray, 1994).
There it is argued that the potential for conﬂict is highest for polarized societies, consisting of
only a few groups, so that that the incentive to deviate from cooperative behavior is invertedly u-
shaped in fractionalization. This hypothesis is supported empirically by Keefer and Knack (2002)
who ﬁnd a non-linear relationship between ethnic homogeneity and the security of property rights
whereby the risk of expropriation is highest for intermediate values of ethnic fractionalization.
Similar results have been found by Zak and Knack (2001) with respect to trust in economic
transactions and by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) with respect to ethnic polarization,
potential conﬂict, and civil wars.




However plausible the polarization results sound, Easterly and Levine (1997) were not able to
ﬁnd a non-linear relationship between fractionalization and economic growth. Here we provide
one explanation for the seemingly contradicting empirical ﬁndings.4 Inspection of (6) shows that
with rising k and thus per capita output y the minimum at nmin is perpetually increasing and
eventually becomes implausibly high to be assumed by any existing society.5 In this case the
theory supports the observed monotonously negative relationship between n and growth. Figure
1 illustrates the result. In other words, in search of non-linear eﬀects across countries it may
4See Lindner and Strulik (2008) for an alternative explanation.
5With respect to ethnic or ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which is the focus of most empirical studies, the
information that an nmin exists where there are, say, 1000 groups is meaningless.
6be important to control for levels of aggregate poverty. A non-monotonous invertedly u-shaped
relationship has – if at all – only a chance to be observed in a sample of poor countries with low
aggregate productivity.
4. The Voracity Effect
Normally we expect that increasing productivity improves economic performances. Interest-
ingly, Lane and Tornell have shown that a “voracity eﬀect” may exist that produces just the
opposite result. Increasing productivity leads to lower growth. In order to work out clearly the
value added by the present paper it may help to begin with a short recap of Lane and Tornell’s
result. In the present paper’s notation they obtain the following growth rate.
g = (A − nρ) ·
σ
n − σ(n − 1)
where σ is the (now constant) elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Obviously, voracity
occurs, ∂g/∂A < 0, if the second term is negative, i.e. if σ > n/(n−1). For a society consisting
of two or more groups, voracity occurs if σ is larger than one.
Besides the reliance on implausibly high rates of intertemporal substitution the voracity re-
sult entails some undesirable “side-eﬀects”. For example, voracity implies that a country with
high productivity, A > nρ, shrinks at a constant rate, whereas a country with low productivity,
A < nρ, grows at a positive rate. This is so because the second term in the above condition
has to be negative for voracity to occur. In other words, voracity is particularly a problem for
high productivity countries. For a country of low productivity, voracity should be a desirable
feature. The appearance of voracity turns an otherwise negative growth rate positive. Most
naturally, we would probably expect that countries plagued by voracity are converging to stag-
nation. Stagnation, however, occurs independently of voracity in case of a knife-edge parameter
constellation (for A = nρ).
Fortunately, all this can be “repaired”. For the present model the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution varies between zero and one depending on the stage of development, but it never
exceeds one implying that Lane and Tornell’s condition for voracity is never fulﬁlled. Never-
theless we can derive some empirically plausible conditions under which voracity occurs. For
simplicity we stick to the log-form of utility ﬁrst and show in the next section that the result
7holds indeed for any type of Stone-Geary utility function, implying that the mechanism that
drives voracity is independent from σ.
Taking the derivatives of (4) w.r.t. A we get (7), verifying that if growth assumes an extremum
















If it exists, the growth minimizing productivity level is found at





Inspection of (8) provides the following results.
Proposition 2. The growth minimizing productivity level depends positively on the rate of
time preference, the level of subsistence needs, and the degree of social fractionalization. It
also depends on the current state of the economy. The growth minimizing productivity level is
decreasing in wealth (k) and thus in per capita output (y) of an economy.
Corollary 1. Ceteris paribus voracity is more likely to occur in fractionalized societies.
Corollary 2. Ceteris paribus voracity is a problem of low productivity countries.
Corollary 3. If voracity occurs, it is attached to poverty. Ceteris paribus voracity becomes
increasingly unlikely with rising per capita output, Amin → 0 for k → ∞ (i.e. for y → ∞).
For an intuition of the voracity eﬀect we distinguish between a direct growth eﬀect and an
appropriation eﬀect. The direct growth eﬀect is always 1, an increase of productivity translates
one-to-one into an increase of the gross return of capital. The appropriation eﬀect leads each
group to grab a higher share of output if productivity rises. From (3) we get the appropriation
eﬀect for a single group as ∂c/∂A = nρ¯ c/(A2k) and thus in total, for n groups n2ρ¯ c/(A2k).
Voracity occurs if the appropriation eﬀect exceeds the direct growth eﬀect, i.e. if n2ρ¯ c/(A2k) > 1,
which is the condition for ∂g/∂A being negative in (7). As shown above, groups are more likely to
appropriate “too much”, i.e. to generate the voracity eﬀect, if they are living close to subsistence
needs, if they discount the future heavily (for example, because they are living in a high mortality
environment), if their society is largely fractionalized, and if productivity is low anyway.






Figure 2 clariﬁes these results further. To the left of Amin, i.e. for low productivity we observe
the voracity eﬀect: a rise of productivity A (or a windfall gain in terms of trade) leads to lower
growth. But because k is itself endogenous, voracity is a context-speciﬁc aﬀair. As observed from
(8), Amin is decreasing in k. Rising k (or, equivalently, rising per capita output Ak) shifts Amin
to the left. Because voracity requires that A < Amin we ﬁnd that, for any given productivity
level, voracity is more likely to occur in poor countries.
Poverty itself, however, is endogenous, which renders voracity to be an “oﬀ-steady-state”
phenomenon. To see this, consider ﬁrst voracity occuring in a growing economy. Then, from
(8), there exists a point of time where k is large enough, i.e. average income is high enough,
such that voracity disappears. Intuitively, current subsistence needs become less pressing so that
the consumption rate does no longer overreact in response to productivity gains. Individuals
realize that a positive productivity shock improves the future returns of capital and restrain
their consumption in response.
Next, assume that a not growing economy is additionally plagued by voracity. In this case the
economy converges towards subsistence. Compute (∂g/∂A)|¯ c = 1 − nρ/A to verify that people
in non-growing economies (i.e. where A < nρ) are indeed voracious at subsistence level. At sub-
sistence level, however, the economy stagnates. There is no growth anyway, a fact that renders
(latent) voracity to be unobservable. The following proposition summarizes these insights.
Proposition 3. In the long-run, economies plagued by voracity do not grow. In the long-run,
people in growing economies behave non-voraciously.
9The results lead towards a reﬁned conceptualization of voracity. In Lane and Tornell’s original
articles voracity was character-contingent. It occurred for voracious people, i.e. when economic
agents were somehow endowed with a too high σ. Here, voracity is context-speciﬁc. People
living in an environment without enforceable property rights behave voraciously if productivity
is so low that their economy converges towards stagnation in the long-run. People with the same
preferences behave “normally” at higher levels of productivity. Of course “normal” behavior just
means non-voracious according to the established deﬁnition. It does not mean a dictionary-proof
opposite of voracious, which could be “moderate” or “cooperative”. Non-voracious, competitive
groups still consume too much and invest too little vis a vis the ﬁrst-best, cooperative solution
(see Lindner and Strulik, 2008).
In a broader interpretation the results provide also theoretical support for Friedman’s (2005)
claim that economic growth helps to sustain basic moral values. While Friedman’s argument
emphasizes the people’s sense of getting ahead in retrospect, the current theory is forward
looking. People behave voraciously only if they live in an environment where they do not
expect enhanced future growth after a positive shock (low productivity, high fractionalization
and mortality). On the other hand, if they expect to get ahead after a positive shock, in the
sense of viability of long-run growth, they are predicted to behave non-voraciously.
The discussion has shown that stagnation at subsistence level is a global phenomenon, i.e. it
will always happen if productivity and the degree of fractionalization do not support growth
without property rights. Voracity, on the other hand is a local phenomenon, happening close to
subsistence. Thus the model is compatible with the following scenario. At the beginning there
was only one appropriating group, the colonial occupying force. Let’s assume A > ρ so that
the economy was growing. At some moment in history the colonial power left and suddenly
there were many (ethnic) groups starting to appropriate output. Output was still relatively
high during this (post-colonial) period but the society was suﬃciently fractionalized so that the
economy could not grow without secure property rights, i.e. A < nρ. Economic growth began
to decline. During this period voracious behavior was not yet an issue. Productivity gains
would have made the country better oﬀ. Yet, at one point of time during the transition towards
stagnation, k became small enough and poverty got severe enough so that people “became
voracious”. Windfall gains of productivity (or of terms of trade) now worsened the problem and
lead to faster convergence towards subsistence. If we imagine that this story applies roughly to
10many Sub-Saharan African countries (and perhaps some Latin American countries as well) and
that entry into the “voracious period” occurred roughly in the 1970’s, it helps to explain the
combined evidence on external shocks and growth performance compiled by Lane and Tornell
(1996, 1999) and Rodrik (1999).
5. The General Case
It remains to be shown that the results are independent from the log-utility form. In order to
prove robustness of the voracity results for a general class of Stone-Geary utility functions we






(ci − ¯ c)(σ−1)/σ · e−ρtdt. (9)





















For σ = 1 the solution collapses to the one obtained for the simple model. Note also that
the (interior) solution obtained by Tornell and Lane (1996) is embedded, which can be seen
by setting ¯ c = 0. For positive ¯ c the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is, as before, not
constant but reaches from zero at subsistence level to σ for ci → ∞. The parameter σ can thus
be understood as the ultimate elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Inserting the solution into the state equation, ˙ k = Ak − nci provides the equilibrium growth
rate (11).
g = A −
σn


























n − σ(n − 1)
=: f(σ). (12)
For the following discussion it is useful to conceptualize the derivative of the growth rate w.r.t.
productivity as a function of the ultimate rate of intertemporal substitution f(σ). In particular,











The ﬁrst term is always positive so that the sign of f0(σ) is determined by the sign of the term
in curly brackets. This term, however, is independent of σ. Thus, recalling that for the lowest
conceivable elasticity of σ = 0, f(0) = 0, we have f(σ) < 0 for all σ > 0 if the term in curly
brackets is negative. In this case we observe voracity. Otherwise, we get the normal reaction.
Formally, ∂g/∂A = f(σ) > 0 forA >
p
ρ¯ c/k · n and ∂g/∂A = f(σ) < 0 forA <
p
ρ¯ c/k · n.
The implied minimum at Amin =
p
ρ¯ c/k · n coincides with the result for the log-utility case
(8). The following proposition and corollary summarize the ﬁnding. Figure 3 provides a visual
illustration.






f(σ) for A < Amin
f(σ) for A > Amin
Proposition 4. For utility of the Stone-Geary type, the occurrence of voracity is independent
from the ultimate elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ. The determinants of voracity are
the same as for the special log-utility form (i.e. as stated in Section 4).
Corollary 4. Starting from general Stone-Geary utility, the results found by Lane and Tor-
nell (1996) can be understood as a consequence of the knife-edge assumption ¯ c = 0.
6. The Two-Sector Model
In an extension of the basic model Tornell and Lane (1999) consider a two-sector economy.
The ﬁrst sector (the formal sector) produces with a common-access asset k while the second
sector (the informal sector, the shadow economy) produces with a closed-access asset. The
12asset stock of members of group i is denoted by bi. Both sectors operate linear technologies
and productivity of the ﬁrst sector (A) is higher than that of the second sector (B).6 Let ri
denote group i’s appropriation of output of the common-access sector. There are two crucial
diﬀerences with respect to the one-sector model. Appropriation from the ﬁrst sector can be used
for investment into the closed-access sector and even if the common-access resource disappears
due to heavy appropriation, the economy may be viable in the long-run, relying exclusively on
produce of the informal sector. Summarizing, the evolution of stocks is given by




˙ bi = Bbi + ri − ci, i = 1,...,n . (14b)
To begin with, a brief recap of the central result from Tornell and Lane (1999) could again be
helpful. Assuming a constant rate of intertemporal substitution σ it is shown that an interior
equilibrium with an active informal sector exists if (in the present paper’s notation)
n ≤ ˜ n ≡
A − σ(B − ρ)
B − σ(B − ρ)
and B > σ(B − ρ) (15)
With contrast to the one-sector model, criticism and “repair” does now not so much focus
on the equilibrium strategies but on the condition for existence of the equilibrium. Why should
the existence of an informal sector depend on the degree of social fractionalization. And then,
why should a shadow economy be less likely in largely fractionalized societies? Intuitively, one
would expect that an informal sector exists as long as property rights in the formal sector
are not protected and productivity in the informal sector is suﬃciently high. The degree of
fractionalization of society would then determine “only” the performance of such a two-sector
economy. From a more general viewpoint, conditions (15) impose rather restrictive conditions
for the existence of the object of investigation. Fortunately these shortcomings disappear after
introducing subsistence needs into the utility function. Below I will show that a suﬃcient
condition for existence of an informal sector is that B > ρ, i.e. the “natural” condition that
productivity exceeds the rate of time preference. The condition is suﬃcient and, in fact, an
informal sector can exist even if it is not fulﬁlled. These ﬁnding make the two-sector model and
6As Lane and Tornell we may distinguish between real productivity α and terms trade p, i.e. A ≡ α · p.
13its propositions about the shadow economy and voracity much more general than it might have
been thought originally.
In order to derive the results in the most convenient way, we return to the log-utility case, i.e.
groups are assumed to maximize (1) with respect to (14). In the Appendix it is shown that this














k + ρbi. (16b)
Result (16a) will be responsible for the voracity eﬀect. Since it coincides with the one found and
discussed by Tornell and Lane, explanation can be brief. The condition requires that investing
(or extracting) a unit of assets has the same net return in both sectors. In doing the calculation,
groups take into account that if they appropriate one unit less of the common-access output,
each of the other groups will appropriate r0
i(k) units more. Since there are n − 1 other groups,
net return on foregone appropriation from the common-access output is A−(n−1)r0
i(k), which
has to be equal to B in equilibrium, rendering thus ri(k) in (16a).















Taking derivatives of growth of the common asset (which equals growth of output of the formal











(n − 1)2 > 0. (18)
Both results are readily explained using condition (16a) once more. Higher productivity in the
common-access sector (dA > 0) leads groups to extract resources faster in order to equilibrate
net returns with the given return in the informal sector (B). Likewise if the number of groups
increases (dn > 0), every single groups appropriates at slower speed in order to equilibrate
sectoral net returns. This eﬀect overcompensates the negative eﬀect resulting from the fact
that output is appropriated by more groups, i.e. n/(n − 1) is decreasing in n. The existence
of a closed-access sector where property rights are protected modiﬁes the results obtained for
14the one-sector economy quite drastically. In particular, it makes voracity a much more general
phenomenon.
The results in (18) have been explored in detail by Lane and Tornell already. I thus now turn to
two aspects that remained yet unexplored, the vanishing common-access sector and convergence
towards subsistence. A major focus will be thereby on the persistence of the informal sector.
Inspect (17a) to verify the following result.
Lemma 1. If A/n > B, then gk < 0, i.e. output of the common-access sector shrinks at a
constant rate.
The condition is fulﬁlled if output per capita of the common-access sector is higher than that
of the informal sector. To see this, recall that bi is the asset of group i so that Bbi is output
of the informal sector per group. The measure of individuals in the economy was normalized to
one. Because there are n groups, each group consists of 1/n individuals implying that nBbi is
the output of the informal sector per capita. On a per capita basis a unit of assets thus produces
output A in the common-access sector and output Bn in the closed-access sector. This implies
A/n > B if we assume that the common-access sector is more productive on a per capita basis.




(Bbi − ¯ c). (19)
Inspection shows that there exists an equilibrium at subsistence level where Bbi = ¯ c. The
equilibrium is stable if ∂˙ bi/∂bi = B −ρ < 0, i.e. if the time preference rate exceeds productivity
of the informal sector. If the equilibrium is unstable (and Bbi(0) > ¯ c), bi is perpetually growing.
This provides the following result.
Proposition 5. If A/n > B, the formal sector vanishes in the long-run. In that case, the
economy converges towards positive constant growth of the informal sector if B > ρ and towards
stagnation if B < ρ.
In others words, plundering of the common asset sector fuels growth of the closed asset sector
if B > ρ, whereas otherwise time preference is too high and the “loot” from the ﬁrst sector
is not invested in the second sector but consumed. Convergence towards subsistence follows.
Since the informal sector produces with private assets and under secure property rights, there
is nothing special about the condition for growth. It is the standard textbook result requiring
15that the rate of return must exceed time preference. One example that would ﬁt these dynamics
(but not so well the original background story proposed by Lane and Tornell) is the plundering
of the tropical rain forest and the creation of private (defendable) arable land.
However, I am not insisting here that A/n > B. If the condition is not fulﬁlled, k grows at
a positive rate. In that case, if B > ρ, production and growth in the informal sector is always
larger than in the cases just discussed because the accumulation of bi is additionally fuelled by
growing appropriation r(k) from the common-access sector. Thus the informal sector is always
active as long as it is suﬃciently productive. The question, however, remains, whether it can
get asymptotically unimportant. This would be the case, if k grows continuously at a higher
rate than bi. To assess this question deﬁne private assets in excess of those necessary to produce
subsistence needs, ˜ bi ≡ bi − ¯ c/B. Then deﬁne the common-to-private asset ratio z = k/˜ bi. If
there were a constant z∗ to which the economy converges, we would have a kind of balanced
growth path along which the relative importance of common and private assets remains constant.
The following proposition, proven in the Appendix, shows that such a path does not exist and
establishes the asymptotic characteristics of sectoral development.
Proposition 6. Consider the case of A/n < B, i.e. long-run growth of the formal sector.
There exists no positive and stable asset ratio z∗ = (k/˜ bi)∗. If B > ρ, limt→∞ z = 0, i.e. the
common access sector disappears asymptotically. If B < ρ, limt→∞ 1/z = 0, i.e. the private
access sector disappears asymptotically.
In other words, only if productivity of the informal sector is suﬃciently low, B < ρ, the
informal sector will disappear asymptotically if the formal sector is growing. Otherwise, for B >
ρ, both sectors grow but the relative importance of the formal sector disappears asymptotically.
Note, again, that B > ρ corresponds with the natural requirement for growth in the textbook
model. Recalling that an informal sector is always active if A/n > B we arrive at a conclusion
on informal production and voracity that is more general than originally thought.
Proposition 7. Any economy starting above subsistence (bi > ¯ c/B) consisting of a formal,
common-access sector and a less productive informal sector with closed access will always produce
in the low productivity sector if productivity in that sector exceeds time preference (B > ρ).
There will always be voracity unless the common access sector is completely plundered and thus
the cause for voracity eliminated.
16Note that voracious behavior and production of the informal sector is independent from the
make up of society. Social fractionalization determines, as derived above, which equilibrium the
economy eventually assumes. Note also that Proposition 7 is utilizing a suﬃcient, not necessary
condition since we have seen that if B < ρ and A/n > B the common access resource gets
completely plundered and the economy stagnates relying exclusively on produce of the informal
sector. Table 1 summarizes the results.
Table 1: Sectoral Performance with Absent Property Rights
B > ρ B < ρ
A > nB common access sector disappears, common access sector disappears,
growth of private access sector stagnation of private access sector
A < nB both sectors grow, both sectors grow,
importance of common access importance of private access
sector vanishes asymptotically sector vanishes asymptotically
7. Final Remarks
In this article I have shown that the introduction of subsistence needs into an otherwise well
known common pool game yields results that are probably harder to refute by the empirical
evidence than those obtained in the earlier literature. In particular the ﬁndings become inde-
pendent from the value that is assumed for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. While
low productivity and the degree of social fractionalization are the main drivers of economic
performance, voracious behavior may occur situation-speciﬁc when output is low.
If productivity is high enough compared to time preference the economy may manage to
escape from subsistence even when (enforceable) property rights are absent. Of course, also the
growing economy suﬀers from competing groups in society as long as property rights remain to be
unprotected. In case of the two-sector model it has been demonstrated that the introduction of
subsistence needs relaxes the conditions for existence of an informal sector. In fact, an informal
sector will – irrespective of the social makeup and of productivity in the formal sector – always
exist if a natural condition is fulﬁlled, namely that the informal sector’s marginal productivity
exceeds the time preference rate.
The introduction of subsistence consumption in form of Stone-Geary utility has been proved
to be a useful tool as well elsewhere in dynamic macroeconomics (see, for example, Easterly,
1994, Ben-David, 1998, Steger, 2000, and Strulik, 2008a). Technically it resolves problems
17arising from the (unrealistic) assumption that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
constant and the implied inﬂexibility. At a deeper level the conceptualization of subsistence
consumption as another “natural constant” appears to be somewhat incomplete. An extension
of the present model towards an endogenous foundation of subsistence needs (for example along
the lines proposed by Dalgaard and Strulik, 2007) is a promising and challenging task for future
research.
18Appendix
Derivation of (3). The easiest way to solve the problem is to start with a transformation of variables.
Let ˜ ci = ci − ¯ c ≥ 0 and ˜ k = k − n¯ c/A ≥ 0, i.e. the deviation of consumption from subsistence level and
the deviation of capital stock from subsistence capital stock. The maximization problem (1) and (2) can









and ˜ k(0) ≥ 0. The current value Hamiltonian reads





















 = λiρ − ˙ λi, (A.2)
and the transversality condition limt→∞ λi(t)[˜ k(t) − ˜ k∗(t)]e−ρt ≥ 0 hold for every group i = 1,...,n and
all feasible paths (˜ k(t),˜ ci(t)).
Applying symmetry, ˜ cj = ˜ ci for all j in (1) and (A.2), diﬀerentiating (A.1) with respect to time and




(A − ρ)˜ ci
A˜ k − n˜ ci
. (A.3)
It can be solved by the method of undetermined coeﬃcients. Guess that ˜ ci = a˜ k and thus ˜ ci
0 = a and
plug this into (A.3) to obtain a = ρ and thus ˜ ci = ρ˜ k.
Next, insert the solution into the equation of motion ˙ ˜ k = A˜ k−n˜ ci, i.e. ˙ ˜ k = A˜ k−nρ˜ k. Solve the linear,
homogenous diﬀerential equation to obtain
˜ k(t) = ˜ k(0)e(A−nρ)t ⇒ ˜ ci(t) = ρ˜ k(0)e(A−nρ)t. (A.4)
Since ˜ k(t) ≥ 0 for all t, we can check for the Malinvaud transversality condition (Sydsaeter et al., 2005,
348-349). These are fulﬁlled if (i)
lim
t→∞
λi(t)e−ρt(0 − ˜ k∗(t)) ≥ 0 (A.5)

























19Set t0 = 0 to verify that λ(t) ≥ 0 for all t > t0 and to conclude that (ii) is fulﬁlled. Thus, the transversality
condition is fulﬁlled. Finally re-transformate variables ˜ ci = ρ˜ k = ρk − ρn¯ c/A and ci = ˜ ci + ¯ c to arrive at
(3).
Derivation of (10). As in the simple case we begin with a transformation of variables ˜ ci = ci − ¯ c ≥ 0














The ﬁrst order condition with respect to ˜ ci is
˜ c
−1/σ
i = λi, (A.6)
Everything else is as before, in the simple case. Applying symmetry, ˜ cj = ˜ ci for all j in (1) and (A.2),
diﬀerentiating (A.4) with respect to time and substituting λi and ˙ λi in (A.6) we get the equilibrium
consumption strategy as deﬁned by the following diﬀerential equation.
˜ ci
0(˜ k) =
(A − ρ)˜ ci
1
σA˜ k + (n − 1 − n
σ)˜ ci
. (A.7)
It can be solved by the method of undetermined coeﬃcients. Guess again that ˜ ci = a˜ k and thus ˜ ci
0 = a










= a˜ k(A − ρ). (A.8)
The non-trivial solution of (A.8) is
a =
σ





















Since ˜ ci and ˜ k grow at the same rate, the transversality condition simpliﬁes to
lim
t→∞




i ˜ k∗(t)e−ρt) = lim
t→∞
(−a˜ k∗(t)−(1−σ)/σe−ρt) ≥ 0. (A.11)














It is readily veriﬁed that this is always true for σ < 1. For σ > 1 we need a restriction on parameters.
Condition (A.11) holds true if either n > σ/(σ−1) and (σ−1)A−σρ < 0, or the opposite, i.e. n < σ/(σ−1)
and (σ − 1)A − σρ > 0.
Derivation of (16). Let’s begin again with a retransformation of variables, ˜ ci = ci − ¯ c; ˜ bi = bi − ¯ c/B.
The Hamiltonian associated with the problem of maximizing (2) subject to (14) is given by









B˜ bi − ˜ ci + ri
i
.













 = λiρ − ˙ λi, (A.13c)
µiB = µiρ − ˙ µi ⇒ −˙ µi/µi = B − ρ. (A.13d)
for all groups i where λi denotes the shadow price of the common stock k and µi is the shadow price
of the private asset ˜ bi. Because appropriation from the ﬁrst sector can be transformed one-to-one into
investment in the second sector, the shadow prices for both assets are equal, which manifests in (A.13b).








(B − ρ)˜ ci
B˜ bi − ˜ ci + ri
. (A.14b)
The linear diﬀerential equation (A.14a) can immediately be solved. The solution is (16a) in the text.
And thus ˜ bi evolves according to




To solve for ˜ ci suppose the solution has the form ˜ ci = a + d˜ bi, where a and d are the coeﬃcients to be
determined. We then have
d
h
B˜ bi + (a + d˜ bi) + ri
i
= (B − ρ)(a + d˜ bi)
Sorting terms.
d˜ bi(ρ − d) = (B − ρ)a − dri + da.
A non-trivial solution of this equation is d = ρ and a = ρri/B and thus after insertion of (16a).






Re-retransformation of variables renders (16b) in the text.
Proposition 6 (and check of transversality conditions). Consider ﬁrst the case A > nB, i.e. the
case of the vanishing common access sector; limt→∞ k = 0.. Thus from (A.16) limt→∞ ˜ ci = ρbi. And then
from (A.15) limt→∞( ˙ ˜ ci/˜ ci) = limt→∞( ˙ ˜ bi/˜ bi)) = B − ρ . Using (A.13a) and (A.13b) the transversality
condition with respect to k simpliﬁes to limt→∞ e−ρte−(B−ρ) · 0, which is trivially fulﬁlled, and the
transversality condition with respect to ˜ bi becomes limt→∞ e−ρt· (−1/ρ) ≥ 0, which is true.




In order to discuss asymptotic properties in this case, it is convenient to deﬁne the asset ratio z ≡ k/˜ bi.












Conclude that z explodes when (B − ρ) < 0. In case of (B − ρ) > 0 there might exist a stable z∗ > 0 to
which the economy converges. Consider (B − ρ) > 0 and assume that such a z∗ exists. From (A.18), it








− (B − ρ).
Since we have assumed that A > B and that (B − ρ) > 0, the factor in front of z∗ at the left hand side
is positive. Thus the right hand side has to be positive for a positive z∗ to exist. This requires
nB − A > (n − 1)(B − ρ) ⇒ (n − 1)ρ > A − B.
Since we have assumed that A < nB, this requires that
(n − 1)ρ > nB − B ⇒ ρ > B,
which is a contradiction to the initial assumption that (B−ρ) > 0. Consequently, there exists no positive
stable z∗ and z converges to zero for (B−ρ) > 0. For inspection of the transversality conditions consider
ﬁrst the case where (B − ρ) > 0 and z vanishes. From (A.16), ˜ ci/˜ bi = ρ + (ρ/B) · (A − B)/(n − 1) · z,
and thus limt→∞ ˜ ci/˜ bi = ρ. Consumption and private assets grow at the same rate eventually. The
transversality condition with respect to ˜ bi simpliﬁes to limt→∞ µ(t)e−ρt(0 − ˜ b∗(t)) = (−1/ρ)e−ρt ≥ 0,
which is true. The transversality condition with respect to k becomes limt→∞ λ(t)e−ρt(0 − k(t)∗) =
limt→∞(−1/ρ)e−(B−ρ)te−ρte
nB−A




⇒ nB − B > nB − A ⇒ A > B,
which was the starting point of the whole analysis. Thus the transversality conditions are fulﬁlled.
The case (B−ρ) < 0 is a mirror image of the case just discussed. Now z goes to inﬁnity in the long-run
implying that 1/z goes to zero, i.e. the private access sector vanishes asymptotically and ˜ ci grows at the
rate of k in the limit. Thus the transversality condition with respect to k simpliﬁes to limt→∞(−e−ρt) ≥ 0,
which is true.
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